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Abstract
The question of whether artificial beings or machines could become
self-aware or consciousness has been a philosophical question for cen-
turies. The main problem is that self-awareness cannot be observed
from an outside perspective and the distinction of whether something
is really self-aware or merely a clever program that pretends to do
so cannot be answered without access to accurate knowledge about
the mechanism’s inner workings. We review the current state-of-the-
art regarding these developments and investigate common machine
learning approaches with respect to their potential ability to become
self-aware. We realise that many important algorithmic steps towards
machines with a core consciousness have already been devised. For
human-level intelligence, however, many additional techniques have
to be discovered.
Introduction
The question of understanding consciousness is in the focus of philosophers
and researchers for more than two millennia. Insights range broadly from “Ig-
norabimus” – “We will never know.”1 to mechanistic ideas with the aim to
construct artificial consciousness following Richard Feynman’s famous words
“What I cannot create, I do not understand.”2.
The major issue that precludes the analysis of consciousness is its sub-
jectivity. Our mind is able to feel and process our own conscious states. By
induction, we are also able to ascribe conscious processing to other human
beings. However, once we try to imagine to be another species, as Nagel de-
scribes in his seminal work “What is it like to be a Bat?” [1], we immediately
fail to follow such experience consciously.
Another significant issue is that we are not able to determine conscious-
ness by means of behavioural observations as Searle demonstrates in his
thought experiment [2]. Searle describes a room that we cannot enter. One
can pass messages written in Chinese to the room and the room returns mes-
sages to the outside world. All the messages and questions passed to the
1With this simple statement, Emil du Bois-Reymond concluded his talk on the limits
of scientific knowledge about the relation of brain processes and subjective experience at
the 45th annual meeting of German naturalists and physicians in 1872.
2Richard Feynman left these words on his blackboard in 1988 at the time of his death
as a final message to the world.
room are answered correctly as a Chinese person would. A first conclusion
would be that there is somebody in the “Chinese Room” who speaks Chinese
and answers the questions. However, the person in the room could also have
simply access to a large dictionary that contains all possible questions and
the respective answers. When we are not able to understand how the infor-
mation is actually processed, we will never be able to determine whether a
system is conscious or not.
In this article, we want to explore these and different thoughts in litera-
ture to address the problem of consciousness. We therefore revisit works in
philosophy, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. Fol-
lowing the paradigm of cognitive computational neuroscience [3], we present
how the convergence of these fields could potentially also lead to new insights
regarding consciousness.
The Philosophical Perspective
More than two thousand years ago, Aristotle was convinced that only humans
are endowed with a rational soul. All animals, however, live only with the
instincts necessary for survival, like biological automata. Along the same
line, in the statement “Cogito ergo sum” also Descartes realised being self-
aware is reserved for human beings. In his view, this insight is fundamental
for any philosophical approach [4].
Modern philosophy went on to differentiate the problem into an easy and a
hard problem. While the “easy problem” is to explain its function, dynamics,
and structure, the “hard problem of consciousness” [5] is summarised in the
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [6] as:
“The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any
physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of
explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious ex-
perience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the
subject.”
In order to avoid confusion some scientists prefer to speak of “conscious
experience” or only “experience” instead of consciousness [5]. As already
noted, the key problem of deriving models of conscious events is that they
can only be perceived subjectively. As such it is difficult to encode such an
experience in a way that it can be recreated by others. This gives rise to the
so-called “qualia problem” [7] as we can never be sure, e.g. that the color
red consciously looks the same to another person. Extension of this line of
thought leads again to Nagel’s thought experiment [1].
According to [6], approaches to tackle the problem from a philosophical
point of view are very numerous, but none of them can be considered to be
exhaustive:
• Eliminativism [8] demonstrates that the mind is fully functional with-
out the experience of consciousness. Being nonfunctional, consciousness
can be neglected.
• The view of strong reductionism proposes that consciousness can
be deconstructed into simpler parts and be explained by functional
processes. Such considerations gave rise to the global work space the-
ory [9–11] or integrated information theory [12,13] in neuroscience. The
main critique of this view, is that any mechanistic solution to conscious-
ness that is not fully understood will only mimic true consciousness,
i.e., one could construct something that appears conscious that simply
isn’t as the Chinese Room argument demonstrates [2].
• Mysterianism proposes that the question of consciousness cannot be
tackled with scientific methods. Therefore any investigation is in vain
and the explanatory gap cannot be closed [14].
• In Dualism the problem is tackled as consciousness being metaphys-
ical that is independent of physical substance [4]. Modern versions of
Dualism exist, but virtually all of them require to reject that our world
can be fully described by physical principles. Recently, Penrose and
Hammeroff tried to close this gap using quantum theory [15, 16]. We
dedicate a closer description of this view in a later section of this article.
• Assuming that metaphysical world and physical world simply do not
interact does not require to reject physics and gives rise to Epiphe-
nomenalism [17].
There are further theories and approaches to address the hard problem of
consciousness that we do not want to detail here. To the interested reader, we
recommend to study the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [6] as further
reading into the topic.
In conclusion, we observe that a major disadvantage of exploring the
subject of consciousness by philosophical means is that we are never able
to explore the inside of the Chinese Room. Thought alone will not be able
to open the black box. Neuroscience, however, offers means to explore the
inside by various means of measurement and might offer suitable means to
address the problem.
Consciousness in Neuroscience
Historical Overview
In 1924, Hans Berger recorded, for the first time, electrical brain activity
using electroencephalography (EEG) [18]. This breakthrough enabled the
investigation of different mental states by means of electrophysiology, e.g.
during perception [19] or during sleep [20]. The theory of cell assemblies,
proposed by Donald Hebb in 1949 [21], marked the starting point for the
scientific investigation of neural networks as the biological basis for percep-
tion, cognition, memory, and action. In 1965, Gazzaniga demonstrated that
dissecting the corpus callosum which connects the two brain hemispheres
with each other results in a split of consciousness [22, 23]. Almost ten years
later, Weiskrantz et al. discovered a phenomenon for which the term “blind-
sight” has been coined: following lesions in the occipital cortex, humans loose
the ability to consciously perceive, but are still able to react to visual stim-
uli [24,25]. In 1983, Libet demonstrated that voluntary acts are preceded by
electrophysiological readiness potentials that have their maximum at about
550ms before the voluntary behavior [26]. He concluded that the role of con-
scious processing might not be to initiate a specific voluntary act but rather
to select and control volitional outcome [27]. In contrast to the above men-
tioned philosophical tradition from Aristotle to Descartes that consciousness
is a phenomenon that is exclusively reserved for humans, in contemporary
neuroscience most researchers tend to regard consciousness as a gradual phe-
nomenon, which in principle also occurs in animals [28], and several main
theories of how consciousness emerges have been proposed so far.
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Based on Singer’s observation that high-frequency oscillatory responses in the
feline visual cortex exhibit inter-columnar and inter-hemispheric synchroniza-
tion which reflects global stimulus properties [29–31] and might therefore be
the solution for the so called “binding problem” [32], Crick and Koch sug-
gested Gamma frequency oscillations to play a key role in the emergence of
consciousness [33]. Koch further developed this idea and investigated neu-
ral correlates of consciousness in humans [34, 35]. He argued that activity
in the primary visual cortex, for instance, is necessary but not sufficient for
conscious perception, since activity in areas of extrastriate visual cortex cor-
relates more closely with visual perception, and damage to these areas can
selectively impair the ability to perceive particular features of stimuli [36].
Furthermore, he discussed the possibility that the timing or synchronization
of neural activity might correlate with awareness, rather than simply the
overall level of spiking [36]. A finding which is supported by recent neu-
roimaging studies of visual evoked activity in parietal and prefrontal cortex
areas [37]. Based on these findings, Koch and Crick provided a framework
for consciousness, where they proposed a coherent scheme to explain the
neural activation of visual consciousness as competing cellular clusters [38].
Finally, the concept of neural correlates of consciousness has been further
extended to an index of consciousness based on brain complexity [39], which
is independent of sensory processing and behavior [40], and might be used to
quantify consciousness in comatose patients [41].
Consciousness as a Computational Phenomenon
Motivated by the aforementioned findings concerning the neural correlates
of consciousness, Tononi introduced the concept of integrated information,
which according to his “Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness”
plays a key role in the emergence of consciousness [12, 13]. This theory rep-
resents one of two major theories of contemporary research in consciousness.
According to this theory, the quality or content of consciousness is identical
to the form of the conceptual structure specified by the physical substrates
of consciousness, and the quantity or level of consciousness corresponds to
its irreducibility, which is defined as integrated information [42].
Tegmark generalized Tononi’s framework even further from neural-net-
work-based consciousness to arbitrary quantum systems. He proposed that
consciousness can be understood as a state of matter with distinctive in-
formation processing abilities, which he calls “perceptronium”, and investi-
gates interesting links to error-correcting codes and condensed matter criti-
cality [43,44].
Even though, there is large consensus that consciousness can be under-
stood as a computational phenomenon [45–48], there is dissent about which
is the appropriate level of granularity of description and modeling [3]. Pen-
rose and Hameroff even proposed that certain features of quantum coher-
ence could explain enigmatic aspects of consciousness, and that conscious-
ness emerges from brain activities linked to fundamental ripples in spacetime
geometry. In particular, according to their model of orchestrated objective
reduction (Orch OR), they hypothesize that the brain is a kind of quantum
computer, performing quantum computations in the microtubeles, which are
cylindrical protein lattices of the neurons’ cytoskeleton [15,49,50].
However, Tegmark and Koch argue, that the brain can be understood
within a purely neurobiological framework, without invoking any quantum-
mechanical properties: quantum computations which seek to exploit the par-
allelism inherent in entanglement, require that the qubits are well isolated
from the rest of the system, whereas on the other hand, coupling the system
to the external world is necessary for the input, the control, and the output
of the computations. Due to the wet and warm nature of the brain, all these
operations introduce noise into the computation, which causes decoherence
of the quantum states, and thus makes quantum computations impossible.
Furthermore, they argue that the molecular machines of the nervous system,
such as the pre- and post-synaptic receptors, are so large that they can be
treated as classical rather than quantum systems, i.e. that there is nothing
fundamentally wrong with the current classical approach to neural network
simulations [51–53].
The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness
In the 1990s, Baars introduced the concept of a virtual “Global Workspace”
that emerges by connecting different brain areas (Figure 1) to describe con-
sciousness [9–11, 54]. This idea was taken up and further developed by De-
haene [55–60]. Today, besides the Integrated Information Theory, the Global
Workspace Theory represents the second major theory of consciousness, be-
ing intensively discussed in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Based on the
implications of this theory, i.e., that consciousness arises from specific types
of information-processing computations, which are physically realized by the
hardware of the brain, Dehaene argues that a machine endowed with these
processing abilities “would behave as though it were conscious; for instance, it
would know that it is seeing something, would express confidence in it,would
report it to others, could suffer hallucinations when its monitoring mecha-
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Figure 1: The Global Workspace emerges by connecting different brain areas
according to Dehaene.
nisms break down, and may even experience the same perceptual illusions as
humans” [61].
Damasio’s Model of Consciousness
Damasio’s model of consciousness was initially published in his popular sci-
ence book “The feeling of what happens” [62]. Later Damasio also published
the central ideas in peer-reviewed scientific literature [63]. With the ideas
being published first in a popular science book, most publications on con-
sciousness neglect his contributions. However, we believe that his thoughts
deserve more attention. Therefore, we want to introduce his ideas quickly in
this section.
The main idea in Damasio’s model is to relate consciousness to the ability
to identify one’s self in the world and to be able to put the self in relation
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Figure 2: Simplified view of Damasio’s model of consciousness: The proto-
self processes emotions and sensory input unconsciously. Core consciousness
arises from the protoself which allows to put the itself into relation. Projec-
tions of emotions give rise to higher-order feelings. With access to memory
and extended functions such as language processing the extended conscious-
ness emerges.
with the world. However, a formal definition is more complex and requires
the introduction of several concepts first.
He introduces three levels of conscious processing:
• The fundamental protoself does not possess the ability to recognize
itself. It is a mere processing chain that reacts to inputs and stimuli
like an automaton, completely non-conscious. As such any animal has
a protoself according to this definition. However, also more advanced
lifeforms including humans exhibit this kind of self.
• A second stage of consciousness is the core consciousness. It is able
to anticipate reactions in its environment and adapts to them. Fur-
thermore, it is able to recognise itself and its parts in its own image
of the world. This enables it to anticipate and to react to the world.
However, core consciousness is also volatile and not able to persist for
hours to form complex plans.
In contrast to many philosophical approaches, core consciousness does
not require to represent representations of the world in words or lan-
guage. In fact, Damasio believes that progress in understanding con-
scious processing has been impeded by dependence on words and lan-
guage.
• The extended consciousness enables human-like interaction with the
world. It builds on top of core consciousness and enables further func-
tions such as access to memory in order to create a autobiographic self.
Also being able to process words and language falls into the category
extended consciousness and can be interpreted as a form of serialisation
of conscious images and states.
In Damasio’s theory emotion and feelings are fundamental concepts [64].
In particular Damasio differentiates emotions from feelings. Emotions are
direct signals that indicate a positive or negative state of the (proto-)self.
Feelings emerge only in conjunction with images of the world and can be
interpreted as a second-order emotion that is derived from the world repre-
sentation and future possible events in the world. Both are crucial for the
emergence of consciousness. Fig. 2 schematically puts the described terms in
relation.
After having defined the above concepts, Damasio now goes on to attempt
and describe a model of (core) consciousness. In his theory, consciousness
does not merely emerge from the ability to identify oneself in the world or
an image of the world. For conscious processing, additionally feeling oneself
in the sense of desiring to exist is required. Hence, he postulates a feeling,
i.e., a derived second-order emotion, between the protoself and its internal
representation of the world. Conscious beings as such want to identify oneself
in the world and want to exist. From an evolutionary perspective as he
argues, this is possibly a mechanism to enforce self-preservation.
In the context of this article, Damasio’s theory is interesting for two major
reasons. On the one hand, it describes a biologically plausible model of con-
sciousness, as he locates all stages of consciousness to structures in the brain
and associates them to the respective function. On the other hand, Dama-
sio describes a mechanistic model that can at least in theory be completely
implemented as a computer program.
Hence, we can conclude that neuroscience is able to describe fundamental
processes in the brain that give rise to complex phenomena such as conscious-
ness. However, the means of observation in neuroscience are insufficient. Nei-
ther EEG nor fMRI have a temporal and spatial resolution that is even close
enough to observe what is happening in the brain in-vivo. At this point, the
recent massive progress in artificial intelligence and machine learning comes
to our attention and will be the focus of our next section.
Consciousness in Machine Learning and AI
In artificial intelligence (AI) numerous theories of consciousness exist [65,66].
Implementations often focus on the global work space theory with only lim-
ited learning capabilities [67], i.e. most of the consciousness is hard-coded and
not trainable [68]. An exception is the theory by van Hateren which relates
the consciousness to close to simultaneous forward and backward processing
in the brain [69]. Yet, algorithms that were investigated so far made use
of a global work space and mechanistic hard-coded models of consciousness.
Following this line, research on minds and consciousness rather focuses on
representation than on actual self-awareness [70]. Although representation
will be important to create human-like minds and general intelligence [71–73],
a key factor to become conscious is the ability to identify a self in one’s en-
vironment [61]. A major drawback of pure mechanistic methods, however,
is that the complete knowledge on the model of consciousness is required
in order to realise and implement them. As such, in order to develop these
models to higher forms such as Damasio’s extended consciousness, a complete
mechanistic model of the entire brain including all connections is required.
Consciousness in Machine Learning
A possible solution to this problem is machine learning, as it allows to form
and train complex models. The topic of consciousness, however, is neglected
in the field to a large extent. On the one hand, this is because of the concerns
that the brain and consciousness will never be successfully simulated in a
computer system [16,74]. On the other hand, consciousness is considered to
be an extremely hard problem and current results in AI are still meager [75].
The state-of-the-art in machine learning instead focuses on supervised and
unsupervised learning techniques [76]. Another important research direction
is reinforcement learning [77] that aims at learning of suitable actions for an
agent in a given environment. As consciousness is often associated with an
embodiment, reinforcement learning is likely to be important for modelling
of consciousness.
The earliest work that the authors are aware of attempting to model and
create agents that learn their own representation of the world entirely using
machine learning date back to the early 1990’s. Already in 1990, Schmidhu-
ber proposed a model for dynamic reinforcement learning in reactive envi-
ronments [78] and found evidence for self-awareness in 1991 [79]. The model
follows the idea of a global work space. In particular, future rewards and
inputs are predicted using a world model. Yet, Schmidhuber was missing
a theory on how to analyse intelligence and consciousness in this approach.
Similar to Tononi [13], Schmidhuber followed the idea of compressed neural
representation. Interestingly, compression is also key to inductive reason-
ing, i.e., learning from few examples which we typically deem as intelligent
behaviour.
Solomonoff’s Universal Theory of Inductive Inference [80] gives a theoretic
framework to inductive reasoning. It combines information and compression
theory and results in a formalisation of Occam’s razor preferring simple mod-
els over complex ones, as simple models are more likely from an information
theoretic point of view [81].
Under Schmidhuber’s supervision, Hutter applied Solomonoff’s theory to
machine learning to form a theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence [82]. In
his theory, intelligent behaviour stems from efficient compression of inputs,
e.g. from an environment, such that predictions and actions are performed
optimally. Again, models capable of describing a global work space play an
important role.
Maguire et al. further expand on this concept to extend Solomonoff’s
and Hutter’s theories to also describe consciousness. Following the ideas of
Tononi and Koch [36] consciousness is understood as data compression, i.e.
the optimal integration of information [81]. The actual consciousness emerges
from binding of information and is inherently complex. As such, conscious-
ness can also not be deconstructed into mechanical sub-components, as the
decomposition would destroy the sophisticated data compression. Maguire et
al. even provide a mathematical proof to demonstrate that consciousness is
either integrated and therefore cannot be decomposed or there is an explicit
mechanistic way of modelling and describing consciousness [81].
Based on the extreme success of deep learning [83], also several scientists
observed similarities in neuroscience and machine learning. In particular,
deep learning allows to build complex models that are hard to analyse and
interpret at the benefit of making complex predictions. As such both fields
are likely to benefit each other in the ability to understand and interpret
complex dynamic systems [3,84–89]. In particular, hard-wiring following bi-
ological ideas might help to reduce the search space dramatically [90]. This
is in line with recent theoretical considerations in machine learning as prior
knowledge allows to reduce maximal error bounds [91]. Both fields can ben-
efit from these ideas as recent discoveries of e.g. successor representation
show [92–94]. Several scientists believe that extension of this approach to so-
cial, cultural, economic, and political sciences will create even more synergy
resulting in the field of machine behaviour [95].
Can Consciousness emerge in Machine Learn-
ing Systems?
After having reviewed philosophy, neuroscience, and the state-of-the-art in
AI and machine learning, we can now analyse the most important concepts
in the field of machine and deep learning to assess whether they have the
potential to create consciousness following one of the previous theories. In
particular, we focus on the ability of the system to represent a symbol of self
and how this self-awareness is constructed, as all theories of consciousness
require at least experiencing the self.
We show a brief overview on important architectures in machine learning
in Fig. 3. We denote hard-wired connections as solid arrows to indicate
recurrent modes of specific network parts. Dashed lines indicate trainable
connections. They could be implemented as a single feed-forward layer, i.e.,
a universal function approximator. Without loss of generality, they could
also be implemented by other deep feed-forward architectures [96] and could
thus be inherently complex. Red double arrows indicate training losses to
adjust the trainable weights of the dashed arrows.
Fig. 3 A shows a simple feed-forward architecture that requires external
labelled training data y∗ to adjust its trainable weights given input x to
produce output y. Fig. 3 B shows a similar setup, for the recurrent case.
Note that we only indicate a simple recurrent cell here with time-dependent
state ht. Without loss of generality, this could also be realised using gated
recurrent units [97] or long short term memory cells [98]. Both models fall
into the category of supervised learning. Consciousness is not supported by
any of the theories presented so far.
In Fig. 3 C, we introduce the concept of “Emotion” following Damasio’s
wording. In machine learning terms, this reflects an additional loss. Now, the
system receives an additional input e that is associated to a valence or value.
Without loss of generality, we can assume positive entries in e to be associated
to desirable states for the system and negative values to undesirable states.
As such, training using e falls into the category of reinforcement learning that
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Figure 3: Overview on typical architectures in machine learning. Hard-coded
paths, i.e. recurrent connections, are indicated by solid arrows, trainable
connections by dashed arrows, and training losses are indicated by red double
arrows. While archtiectures A-E do not match theories of consciousness,
architectures F-H implement theories by Schmidhuber and Damasio.
aims at maximizing future values of e. In order to model competing interests
and saturation effects, e.g. a full battery does not need to be charged further,
we introduce a reference e∗ that is able to model such effects. Note that we
deem the system to be able to predict the expected future reward e′ from its
current state ht following a deep Q learning paradigm [99]. Here we use e
′
and e∗ to construct a trainable reinforcement loss, to be able to learn from
low-level rewards/emotions e. Although being able to learn, the system still
needs supervision to train the weights producing output y using a reference.
This setup also does not match any theory of consciousness so far.
As self-awareness is a requirement for base consciousness, we deem a world
model to be necessary. Such an approach his shown in Fig. 3 D. Given from
the produced output y, the world model is used to create an expected future
input x′. In the figure, we chose a recurrent model capturing the state of
the world in wt that is independent of the internal state of the actual agent
ht. To gain consciousness, this model misses at least a link from internal
to external state and “emotions” that would guide future decisions. Adding
low-level rewards/emotions results in Fig. 3 E. Again world and self are
disconnected inhibiting self-representation and self-discovery. Approaches
like this are already being explored for video game control [100].
With a world-model being present, we are now able to predict future
rewards e′′ that also take into account the state of the world and the chosen
action. As such Fig. 3 F is the first one that would implement a trainable
version of deep Q learning. Development of consciousness is debatable, as
the model does not feature a link between the state of the world and the
state of the agent. If we would add a trainable connection from ht to wt and
vice versa, we would end up with Schmidhuber’s Model from 1990 [78] for
which Schmidhuber found evidence to develop self representation [79].
Interestingly, Damasio’s descriptions follow a similar line in [62]. We
depict a model implementing Damasio’s core consciousness in Fig. 3 G. As
Schmidhuber, Damasio requires a connection from the world model wt to
the body control system ht. However, in his view, consciousness does not
emerge by itself. It is enforced by a “feeling” that is expressed as a loss in the
world of machine learning. As such, the Damasio model of core consciousness
requires a loss that aims at the recovery of the image of the self in the world
model. If this is implemented as a loss, we are able to express the desire to
exist in the world. If implemented merely as trainable weights, we arrive at
the theory of integrated information that creates consciousness as maximized
compression of the world, the self, and their interaction. Interestingly, these
considerations also allow integration of attention [101] and other concepts of
resolving context information in machine learning. Realised in a biological
learning framework, e.g. using neuromodulators like Dopamin [102], the
notion of loss and connection will disappear and the models of Damasio,
Schmidhuber, Tononi, Koch, and Dehane turn out to be different descriptions
of the same principles.
Note that the models of consciousness that we have discussed so far are
very basic. They do not concern language, memory, or other complex multi-
modal forms of processing, planning, induction, or representation. Again, we
follow Damasio at this point in Fig. 3 H in which all of these sophisticated
processes are mapped into a block “Memory / Extended Functions”. Note al-
though we omit these extended functions, we are able to integrate them using
trainable paths. As such, the model of core consciousness acts as a “neural
operating system” that is able to update also higher order functions accord-
ing to the needs of the environment. With increasing “extended functions”,
the degree of complexity and “integrated information” rises measurably as
also observed by Casarotto [39].
This brings us back to the original heading of our section: There are
clearly theories that enable modelling and implementation of consciousness in
the machine. On the one hand, they are mechanistic to the extend that they
can be implemented in programming languages and require similar inputs
as humans would do. On the other hand, even the simple models in Fig.3
are already arbitrarily complex, as every dashed path in the models could be
realised by a deep network. As such also training will be hard. Interestingly,
the models follow a bottom-up strategy such that training and development
can be performed in analogy to biological development and evolution. The
models can be trained and grown to more complex tasks gradually.
Discussion
Existence of consciousness in the machine is a hot topic of debate. Even
with respect to the simple core consciousness, we observe opinions ranging
from “generally impossible” [103] through “plausible” [61] to “has already
been done” [79]. Obviously, all of the suggested models cannot solve the
qualia problem or the general problem on how to demonstrate whether a
system is truly conscious. All of the emerging systems could merely be mim-
icking conscious behaviour without being conscious at all (even Fig. 3 A).
Yet as already discussed by Schmidhuber [79], we would be able to measure
correlates of self recognition similar to neural correlates of consciousness in
humans [35] which could help to understand consciousness in human beings.
However, as long as we have not solved how to provide proof of consciousness
in human beings, we will also fail to do so in machines as the experience of
consciousness is merely subjective.
Koch and Dehaene discussed the theories of global work space and in-
tegrated information as being opposed to each other [103]. In the models
found in Fig. 3, we see that both concepts require a strong degree of inter-
connection. As such, we do not see why both concepts are fundamentally
opposing. A global work space does not necessarily have to be encoded in
decompressed state. Also, Maguire’s view of integrated information [81] is
not necessarily impossible to implement mechanistically, as we are able to
use concepts of deep learning to train highly integrated processing networks.
In fact, as observed by neuroscience [3], both approaches might support each
other yielding methods to construct and reproduce biological processes in a
modular way. This allows the integration of representation [71] and process-
ing theories [65] as long as they can be represented in terms of deep learning
compatible operations [91].
In all theories that we touched in this article, the notion of self is funda-
mental. Hence, all presented theories of consciousness require embodiment as
basis for consciousness. As such, a body is required for conscious processing.
Also the role of emotion and feelings is vital. Without emotion or feelings,
the system cannot be trained and thus it can not adopt to new environments
and changes of circumstances. In the machine learning inspired models, we
assume that a disconnection between environment and self would cause a
degradation of the system similar to the one that is observed in human be-
ings in locked-in state [104]. This homeostatsis was also deemed important
by Man et al. [105].
Similar to the problems identified by Nagel, also the proposed mechanistic
machine learning models will not be able to understand “what it is like” to
be a bat. However, the notion of train-/learnable programs and connections
or adapters might offer a solution to explore this in the future. Analogously,
one cannot describe to somebody “what it is like” to play the piano or to
snowboard on expert level unless one really acquires the ability. As such also
the qualia problem persists in machine consciousness. However, we are able
to investigate the actual configuration of the representation in the artificial
neural net offering entirely new mechanisms of insight.
In Damasio’s theory, consciousness is effectively created by a training
loss that causes the system to “want” to be conscious, i.e., ”Cogito ergo
sum” becomes ”Sentio ergo sum”. Comparison between trainable connec-
tions after [78], attention mechanisms [101], and this approach are within
the reach of future machine learning models which will create new evidence
for the discussion of integrated information and global work spaces. In fact,
Schmidhuber has already taken up the work on combination of his early ideas
with modern approaches from deep learning [106,107].
With models for extended consciousness, even the notion of the Homuncu-
lus [108] can be represented by extension of the self with another self pointer.
In contrast to common rejection of the Homunculus thought experiment, this
recurrent approach can be trained using end-to-end systems comparable to
AlphaGo [109].
Damasio also presents more interesting and important work that is mostly
omitted in this article for brevity. In [62] he also relates structural brain
damage to functional loss of cognitive and conscious processing. Also the
notion of emotion is crucial in a biological sense and is the driving effect of
homeostasis. In [105], Damasio already pointed out that this concept will be
fundamental for self-regulating robotic approaches.
With the ideas of cognitive computational neuroscience [3] and the ap-
proaches detailed above, we will design artificial systems that approach the
mechanisms of biological systems in an iterative manner. With the itera-
tions, the artificial systems will increase in complexity and similarity to the
biological systems. However, even if we arrive at an artificial system that
performs identical computations and reveals identical behaviour as the bio-
logical system, we will not be able to deem this system as conscious beyond
any doubts. The true challenge in being perceived as conscious will be the ac-
ceptance by human beings and society. As Alan Turing already proposed in
his imitation game in 1950 to decide whether a machine is intelligent or even
conscious [110], the ascription of such by other humans is a critical factor.
For this purpose, Turing’s Test has already been extended to also account for
embodiment [111]. However, such tests are only necessary, but not sufficient
as Gary Marcus pointed out: Rather simple chat bot models are already
able to beat Turing’s Test in some occasions [112]. Hence, requirements for
conscious machines will comprise, the similarity to biological conscious pro-
cesses, the ability to convince human beings, and even the machine itself. As
such, we deem it necessary to look as some ethical implications at this point.
Ethical implications
Being able to create systems that are indistinguishable from conscious beings
that are potentially conscious also raises ethical concerns. First and foremost,
in the transformation from core consciousness to extended consciousness, the
systems gain the ability to link new program routines. As such systems
following such a line of implementation need to be handled with care and
should be experimented on in a contained environment. With the right choice
of embodiment in a virtual machine or in a robotic body, one should be able
to solve such problems.
Of course there are also other ethical concerns, the more we approach
human-like behaviour. A first set of robotic laws has been introduced in
Asimov’s novels [113]. Even Asimov considered the rules problematic as can
be seen from the plot twists in his novels. Aside this, being able to follow
the robotic laws requires the robot to understand the concepts of “humans”,
“harm”, and “self”. Hence, such beings must be conscious. Therefore, tam-
pering with their memories, emotions, and feelings is also problematic by
itself. Being able to copy and reproduce the same body and mind does not
lead to further simplification of the issue and implies the problem that we
have to agree on ethics and standards of AI soon [114].
Conclusion
In this article, we reviewed the state-of-the-art theories on consciousness in
philosophy, neuroscience, AI, and machine learning. We find that all three
disciplines need to interact to push research in this direction further. In-
terestingly, basic theories of consciousness can be implemented in computer
programs. In particular, deep learning approaches are interesting as they of-
fer the ability to train deep approximators that are not yet well understood to
construct mechanistic systems of complex neural and cognitive processes. We
reviewed several machine learning architectures and related them to theories
of strong reductionism and found that there are neural network architectures
from which base consciousness could emerge. Yet, there is still a long way to
form human-like extended consciousness.
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